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ABSTRACT
Most models of the rental housing market assume a close linkage between the level of
residential rents and the after-tax user cost of rental housing capital. However, little empirical
evidence exists to establish the strength of this linkage or the speed with which rents adjust to
changes in user cost or tax policy. This paper develops and estimates an econometric model of
the rental housing market in order to shed light on both of these issues. United States annual data
for 1964 through 1993 are used to generate two-stage least squares estimates of a four equation
structural model. Although the results are generally consistent with expectations and reveal
several interesting relationships among the system variables, the estimates fail to identify a strong
relationship between rent and user cost. Only half of an increase in user cost is ultimately passed
along as higher rents. The adjustment process also takes a long time, with only about half of the
long-run effect realized within ten years of a user cost shock. The fundamental reason for this
result is that our estimate of the user cost series, based upon widely accepted procedures with by
to calculate user cost, is much more volatile than the residential rent series. In a recent paper,
DiPasquale and Wheaton also find a slow adjustment process. Nonetheless, such sluggishness is
surely different than many economists believe. We offer several possible explanations for this
result. Among these is the possibility that the linkage between rent and user cost is too complex
to be identified using 30 years of national data.

IN SEARCH OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT LINKS
RENT AND USER COSTS
Introduction

The proposition that residential rents ultimately reflect rental user cost, as measured by
changes the real after-tax cost of capital used to produce rental housing, is widely held. A
corollary to this proposition implies that changes in the tax treatment of rental housing which
affect user cost generate changes in the level of rents. However, little empirical evidence
currently exists to support these propositions, and even less is known about the speed with which
rents adjust to changes in user cost or tax policy.
These relationships are central to answering at least two important questions, First, who
benefits from tax policies designed to reduce rents? If these policies do not generate lower rents,
then the beneficiaries are owners of rental housing units and not the tenants who occupy them.
This outcome is not the goal of such tax policies. Second, how do these policies affect the asset
price of rental housing? If rent levels adjust slowly to changes in tax policy, then large changes in
the asset price of rental housing can result. Consequently, windfall gains can accrue to owners of
this housing if favorable tax policies are enacted. Alternatively, unfavorable policies can generate
windfall losses for owners and others with a stake in this housing. For example, lenders who
collateralize mortgages with this housing may suffer from an unfavorable tax policy such as the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) because asset prices will decline and defaults will rise.
Hendershott, Follain and Ling (HFL) (1987) and Follain, Hendershott and Ling (FHL)
(1987) have considered these questions in simulation analysis of the rental housing market. They
focus primarily on TRA's impact upon long-run equilibrium rents, but they also consider its effects
upon asset prices using rather ad hoc assumptions about the speed at which rents adjust to user
cost. Ling's recent simulation analysis (1992) extends the HFL approach. Unfortunately, none of
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this work provides strong empirical evidence to support the parameterization of the model,
especially the speed with which rents adjust to long-run equilibrium.
Alm and Follain (1994) develop a theoretical basis for empirical work on these questions.
Their central message is that the linkage between user cost and rent depends upon the structure of
the rental housing market. A four equation discrete dynamic model is developed and examined to
explore the linkage. The system consists of a demand equation for housing, an accounting
identity that monitors the size of the housing stock, a construction equation, and an asset price
equation. This last equation is the key to the analysis and posits that the asset price of housing
equals replacement cost plus the sum of the future or expected gap between rent in period t + i
and user cost. They also consider various specifications of household expectations about future
movements in market rent. Their simulations demonstrate the factors that affect the speed with
which rents adjust, but like HFL, the parameterization of the simulation model is not supported by
empirical evidence.
Follain, Leavens and Velz (FLV) (1993) examine the empirical relationship between rent
and user cost. They estimate a reduced form model of the rental housing market using pooled
time-series and cross-section data at the metropolitan level. They find that changes in user cost
significantly affect construction, but not the level of rents. Their results do not necessarily
indicate that such a link does not exist because data limitations prohibit estimation of the exact
structural model suggested by Alm and Follain. However, coupled with casual observation of the
data and the number of specifications considered, they suggest that if a strong relationship does
exist, it is a subtle one that will not be easily uncovered.
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992) offer the most comprehensive empirical analysis to date
of the linkage between rent and user cost. They estimate a two equation model of the demand for
rental housing and the construction of multifamily units using United States data for 1964 through
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1989. Their estimates suggest that rents rise modestly in response to an increase in user cost. In
contrast are Hendershott's (1994) recent results. He estimates a single equation model using office
rents in Australia and finds a much stronger relationship between rents and user cost.
This paper seeks to develop and estimate an econometric model of the rental housing
market. The basic elements of the model draw upon the papers noted above, especially AlmFollain and DiPasquale-Wheaton. Like both papers, the model emphasizes the structural
equations underlying the rental housing market and the dynamic characteristics of the housing
market as it adjusts to long-run equilibrium values. Unlike both papers, it attempts to model both
the demand for rental housing services and the demand for rental housing units. Alm-Follain
model only the demand for housing services, while DiPasquale-Wheaton model only the demand
for housing units.
The paper first presents an econometric model of the rental housing market and discusses
its underlying theoretical framework. Then the data used to estimate the model are described.
The empirical results are presented and evaluated, and finally the important conclusions of the
analysis are highlighted.

Model Specification

The econometric model is derived from a larger and more detailed structural framework.
This structural model is represented by a six-equation, six-unknown system of linear simultaneous
equations. The system includes equations determining the demand for rental housing per
household, the number of renter households, the aggregate supply of rental housing, construction,
the asset price of rental housing, and rental price adjustment.
The demand side of the rental housing market includes equations representing the demand
per household and the number of renter households. The demand for rental housing services per
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household (qt) in period t depends upon the real rental price (prt) per unit of constant quality
rental housing and the permanent income (YPt) of a typical renter household.
qt

f (prt , YPt )

(1)

Standard consumer theory suggests housing demand varies inversely with rental price and directly
with income. Tenure choice is reflected in the renter households equation. The number of renter
households (NRt) depends upon the relative price of rental and owner-occupied housing (prt/POt),
the permanent income of a typical household, and the size of the adult population (POPt).
NRt

f (prt /PO t , YPt, POP t )

(2)

Increases in the relative price of renting or household income will encourage home ownership and
reduce the demand for rental dwellings. Assuming demand per household is typical of renter
households generally, the aggregate demand for rental housing services (QDt) is the product of
housing services demanded per renter household from (1) and the number of renter households
from (2), or QDt = qtNRt.
The supply side of the rental housing market includes equations for aggregate supply and
construction. Each period's aggregate supply (QSt) of rental housing equals last period's
aggregate supply, net of depreciation, plus this period's construction (Ct).1
QSt

(1

d) QSt

1

Ct ,

(3)

where d equals the housing depreciation rate. Construction in period t depends upon profit
opportunities as reflected in the difference between asset price (PRt) and replacement cost (PRCt).
Ct

1

(PRt

PRC t ),

This formulation assumes that new construction is completed in one period.

(4)
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where

reflects the responsiveness of construction to the gap between asset price and

replacement cost.2
The asset price of rental housing each period equals the discounted value of the future "net
income" of rental housing each period. With net income equal to rent less depreciation and an
interest rate r, the asset price each period is given by:
PRt

[( prt

i

d PRt )/ ( 1

R)i ].

(5)

i 1

The asset price adjusts each period as future net income is capitalized into the current price of
rental housing so that the long-run equilibrium asset price (PR*) equals replacement cost.
The final equation in the system recognizes that the rental housing market may adjust
gradually to changes in the exogenous variables that drive it. This process is similar to those used
by DiPasquale-Wheaton and Alm-Follain. Movements in rental price respond to excess aggregate
supply according to:
prt / prt
where

1

(QSt

QD t ),

measures the responsiveness of rental price to excess supply (-

(6)
0), QS is aggregate

housing supply and QD is aggregate housing demand.
This six-equation system is modified in four ways to arrive at the econometric model for
estimation. First, a proxy for the current asset price is needed in the empirical analysis because an
index of the asset price of rental housing is unavailable. We assume the current asset price is
proxied by the gap between the current level of rents and the user cost of capital. It is apparent
from equation (5) that the current asset price is a complex function that depends upon the manner

2

A more elaborate construction equation like (3) can be derived as the outcome of an
intertemporal profit maximization problem as in Turnbull (1988). We use this simple specification
because it is a quite common specification and because a more elaborate construction equation
adds little to the central message of this paper.
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in which expectations about the future gap between rent and replacement cost are formed. Alm
and Follain (1994), DiPasquale and Wheaton (1995), Mankiw and Weil (1989) and others
investigate various assumptions such as perfect foresight, adaptive expectations, and rational
expectations. Testing these various models poses difficult econometric problems and strict data
requirements. Given the limitations imposed by our data, a simpler approach is adopted here, but
one which still captures the essence of the underlying model.3 This simplification should be kept
in mind in assessing the performance of the supply equation because the rejection of a strong
relationship between the supply of housing and the rent-user cost gap is actually a test of two
separate hypotheses; one relates to the user cost model and one relates to the rent adjustment
process. Substituting this asset price formulation into the construction equation, and then into the
accounting relationship in (3) yields:
QSt
where

(1

d) QSt

1

(prt

prt )

(3')

is a parameter which captures the complex relationship between the asset price-

replacement cost gap and the rental price-user cost gap.
Second, the supply equation is modified to include the lagged excess supply [(QS - QD)t1].

This implies that builders may respond not only to the rental price-user cost gap, but also to

the quantity gap. This could arise because prospective developers are just as hampered by the
lack of information about current asset prices as are builders of econometric models. As such,

3

A formal justification for this proxy can be developed if one assumes that rents follow a
partial adjustment process, for example, (prt - prt-1) = (1-g)(prt - pr*) where g is the rate of
adjustment parameter. In such a case, it can be shown that the asset price in equation (5)
simplifies to PR = (pr - pr*)/(g + r).
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they may use an easier to obtain measure of the tightness of a housing market, like vacancies. In a
units oriented model like DiPasquale-Wheaton, the vacancy rate serves this role directly.4
Third, the rent adjustment equation includes the lagged difference between rental price and
user cost. Increases in the magnitude of this gap will tend to slow the rate of increase in rent.
This proves to be a powerful channel in the estimated model.
Fourth, previous work suggests that autocorrelation will likely arise with the data used to
estimate the model. Anticipating this, both the services and units demand equations are specified
in partial adjustment forms. This approach allows both short-run and long-run elasticities to be
defined for these equations. Each of the other equations in the system already includes its lagged
value among the regressors.
Model Summary
Assuming log-linear functional forms, these modifications yield the following specification
of the econometric model to be estimated:
Demand Per Household
ln(qt)

1ln(pr t)

0

2ln(YP t)

3ln(qt 1)

Number of Renter Households
ln(NRt)

0

1[ln(prt)

(ln(uco t) ln(PRt))]

2ln(YP t)

3ln(POP t)

4ln(NRt 1)

Aggregate Supply Equation
ln(QSt)

0

1ln(pr t)

ln(QD)]t

4

1

2[ln(ucr t)

ln(PRCt)]

3[ln(QS)

4ln(QSt 1)

We also experimented with variables suggested by an accelerator theory of investment like the
rate of change in gross national product. These generally performed poorly and are excluded
from the supply equation.
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Rent Adjustment
ln(prt)

0

1ln(prt 1)

2[ln(pr)

ln(ucr PRC)]t

1

3[ln(QS)

ln(QD)]t

1

The expected signs of the coefficients are indicated in this summary. It also shows explicitly
several coefficient restrictions implied by the underlying theoretical model which will be
empirically examined.

Data Description

The econometric model is estimated using United States aggregate annual data from 1964
through 1993. Data of this type are not ideally suited to examine the issues addressed in this
paper. One potentially important weakness is the absence of a direct measure of the asset price of
rental housing. We incorporate its effects by relying on proxies for it. The limited number of
available observations poses another problem, just as it does for most macroeconomic studies.
Furthermore, these data aggregate over a wide variety of local housing markets that respond in
different ways to nationally triggered shocks. Despite these weaknesses, we believe these data
can be reasonably used to address the questions posed in this study. Our data set includes
measures of more relevant variables than can be obtained for smaller geographic regions.5 More
importantly, identifying a strong linkage between rent and user cost using data with obvious
deficiencies would constitute convincing evidence of the user cost model and the power of tax
policy. Conversely, failure to identify a strong linkage would not constitute a powerful rejection
of the theory. Weak evidence may direct researchers to other and better data to identify the

5

Follain, Levens and Velz discuss some weaknesses associated with using metropolitan level
data.
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linkage. Alternatively, it may suggest that the standard user cost model of HFL, FHL, and others
ought to be modified to account for less than full adjustment of rent to changes in user cost.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 for all variables used in the estimation. The
data are obtained primarily from the CitiCorp data base and the Department of Commerce. The
definitions of the supply and demand for rental housing distinguish our approach from some other
studies of the rental housing market, in particular, DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992). Our
approach seeks to incorporate both units and services concepts. The aggregate supply of rental
housing stock (QS) is the Department of Commerce's series for the constant cost value of the net
stock of privately owned tenant-occupied housing (Musgrave, 1993, Table 12).6 Changes in this
stock series represent new construction or new investment in rental housing.
Multifamily starts are also frequently employed as a measure of investment in rental
housing. We prefer the stock series because it represents rental housing specifically and, in
theory, allows a distinction to be made between the number of new housing units and the services
provided by these units. The multifamily starts series includes some units destined to

6

1993 values were provided by Michael Glenn of the Department of Commerce. The constant
cost series is in 1987 dollars.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Descriptiona

Name

Mean

Standard
Deviation

q

Rental Quantity per HH

$29,507

$2,917

NR

Number of Renters (thousands)

27,569

4,691

QS

Real Aggregate Rental Supply ($bill)

$880.40

$220.25

QD

Real Aggregate Rental Demand ($bill)

$824.12

$203.29

QS-QD

Excess Rental Supply ($bill)

$56.28

$19.21

pr

Real Rent ($)

$1,507.28

$86.34

pgdp

GDP Deflator (1987=100, SA)

0.685

0.326

YP

Real Consumption per HH (dollars)

$30,898

$2,660

uco

Owner User Cost Rate (percents)

4.41%

1.17%

ucr

Rental User Cost Rate (percents)

8.82%

3.54%

PR

Real Asset Price of Rental Unit (dollars)

$23,746

$1,618

ucr*PRC

Real Rental User Cost (dollars)

$2,235.12

$965.46

pr-ucr*PRC

Real Rent-User Cost Gap (dollars)

-$727.83

$962.89

PRC

Real Replacement Cost of Apartment

$25,152.55

$1,530.00

POP

Adult Population ( 16 yrs. mill)

165.704

21.949

a

Real values are expressed in constant 1987 dollars.
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be owner-occupied and omits single family rental housing units, improvement expenditures for
rental housing, and conversions in occupancy status. Figure 1 presents an investment series based
on the Commerce data and the multi-family starts series. Although the series are highly
correlated, discrepancies occur in the early 1970s, the late 1970s, and the early 1990s. Identifying
the reasons for these discrepancies is a difficult task, but they do seem to lend support to our
preference for the stock series, which, in theory, provides appropriate measures of aggregate
supply and investment in rental housing.
The aggregate demand for rental housing is the occupied rental housing stock (QD),
defined as aggregate supply multiplied by one minus the rental vacancy rate. The Census H-111
series on vacancy rates is used to measure the rental housing vacancy rate. This may understate
demand because vacant units are probably below the average value of all rental housing units, but
we uncovered no data or method by which to incorporate this into the demand series.
The aggregate demand for rental housing may also be viewed as the product of the
quantity of housing services generated by the average occupied rental housing unit and the total
number of occupied rental housing units. The number of renter households (NR) equals the total
number of households multiplied by one minus the home ownership rate. The latter two series are
obtained from the Census. The demand per renter household (q) equals aggregate demand
divided by the number of renter households (QD/NR). Indexes of the two components of rental
housing demand are presented in Figure 2. Per household demand rises relatively quickly until the
late 1970s, falls briefly, and then levels off. The number of renter households grows at about 2.3
percent per year, although its growth was well above this average during most of the 1980s.

MF Starts and Change in Stock
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Excess supply is defined as the difference between aggregate supply and aggregate
demand. The excess supply series in millions of dollars and the vacancy rate are plotted in Figure
3. Since the vacancy rate is used to derive the demand series, excess supply tracts the vacancy
rate closely. Both series show the substantial rise in excess supply during the middle and late
1980s. In dollar terms, the amount of the excess supply totals nearly $90 billion dollars. As may
be expected, this large overhang of excess capacity has a dampening effect upon the current status
and near term future of the market for new rental housing.
The rental price (pr) of rental housing plays an important role in the model presented in
the previous section. This measure is generated by modifying the residential rent component of
the Consumer Price Index in three ways. First, the index is adjusted upward by 0.5 percent per
year to offset a potential downward bias in the index due to its likely underestimation of
depreciation. This bias arises because the rent index is based upon the average rent among a
sample of existing properties. As such changes in the average rent among this sample is likely to
understate movements in the market price of rental housing.7 Second, the series is converted to a
real rent series using the GDP deflator. Third, the index is applied to the average value of a rental
unit in 1964.
A critical variable in this analysis is rental user cost. Our approach follows closely that
used by HFL, FHL, and Follain and Ling. In essence, a multiperiod present value model is used
to compute the first period rent that sets the net present value of the project equal to zero. The
cash flows of the project include rent less operating expenses, real appreciation less physical
depreciation of the project, tax benefits, and other costs associated with the construction and sale
of the unit. The principle difference between our series and the others

7

Others have noted this bias and made similar adjustments. See Apgar et al. (1987) and
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992).

Figure 3

90000

8.5

80000

8
7.5

70000

7

60000

6.5

50000

6

40000

5.5

30000
1964 1970 1976 1982 1988
Years

5

Excess Supply (QS - QD)

Vacancy Rate

Rental Vacancy Rate

Excess Supply (millions of $)

Excess Supply

16
deal with the complexities of computing user cost for an annual time series. The other work
focuses on one or two time periods.
One key component of the user cost calculations is the expected inflation series. We use
quarterly data to estimate an adaptive expectations model in which the current value of the GDP
deflator is regressed on four lags. Expected inflation is a three year moving average of the
quarterly predicted values of the GDP deflator. We investigated various versions of this approach
and chose this one because it is both reasonable and less likely to generate sharp and short-lived
spikes in expected inflation.
The cash flows of the project do not include payments on a mortgage. The discount rate
is an after-tax discount rate that represents a weighted average cost of capital. As discussed by
FHL, this is done to eliminate the need to continuously update the optimal debt to equity ratio and
to remain consistent with the corporate finance approach to capital budgeting. The discount rate
(IER) is:
IER

(1

MTRR) ID[ 1

(1

MTRPR) MRP ]

(7)

where MTRR and MTRPR are the marginal tax rates of the investor for ordinary income and
equity income, respectively. These may differ because of the tax treatment of capital gains. ID is
the nominal interest rate represented by the ten year Treasury rate and MRP is a risk premium.
The only difference between this discount rate and FHL's is that the risk premium is proportional
rather than additive to the nominal discount rate, which seems appropriate in a time series
context.
Several parameters must be assigned to complete the present value calculations. Some are
invariant to the tax regime, including the property tax rate (.02), the sales commission rate (.06),
and the land to property value ratio (.85). Several others vary by tax regime. The marginal tax
rate of the investor in rental property equals .50 prior to 1982, .45 for 1982 through 1986, and
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.36 after 1986. The capital gains tax rate equals .5 prior to 1978, .4 for 1978 through 1986, and 1
after 1986. The useful life of a property for tax purposes equals 30 years prior to 1982, 15 years
for 1982-83, 18 years for 1984, 19 years for 1985-86, and 27.5 years since 1987. The method of
depreciation is 200 percent of straight line until 1982, 175 percent for 1982-86, and straight line
since 1987. The optimal determination of whether to use the accelerated or straight line method
is taken into account. The holding period for rental property investments is allowed to vary
among tax regimes. With two exceptions, the holding period is set equal to the useful tax life of
the property, which is a result that is produced by simulations in which the holding period is
chosen as the one that minimizes user cost. The two exceptions pertain to the 1964-68 period
when the optimal holding period is 12 years and the 1982-86 period in which we allow for
multiple trading.8 Otherwise, only one trade is allowed because multiple trading, or churning, has
little impact on the size of user cost. FHL explain the reasoning underlying this approach in more
detail.
User cost and rent expressed in real dollars are plotted in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 also
includes the user cost rate in percent. Several aspects of these patterns are noteworthy. The user
cost series in real dollars and as a rate are quite comparable. The user cost rate fluctuates around
6 and 7 percent until the latter part of the 1970s when it declines substantially. This is probably a
response to an increase in expected inflation and a less than full adjustment of nominal interest
rates to it. The rapid rise in the early 1980s is due primarily to higher interest rates and lower
inflationary expectations, and occurred despite

8

The key in the 1964-68 period is the recapture provision, which changed in 1969 to
discourage multiple trading. FHL analyze the impact of multiple trading and show that user cost
declines modestly if multiple trading is allowed. Although the allowance for multiple trading is
appropriate and produces a modest change in the user cost series for these years, it has no impact
upon the basic results in this paper.
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generous tax policy. FHL and others have noted and discussed this previously. A sharp rise in
user cost occurs in 1987 because of TRA, but user cost has declined since then due to the general
decline in interest rates.
The most important point to note about these series is the relative volatility of rent and
user cost. Rent is a stable, slow-moving series compared to user cost. This pattern portends a
result that emerges from the econometric investigation below. Such disparities in the volatility of
the rent and user cost series make it difficult to identify a strong linkage between rent and user
cost.
A series on the user cost of owner-occupied housing is also produced by a similar but less
complicated procedure because the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing is simpler. The two
main differences are that the discount rate equals 90 percent of the investor's discount rate and the
tax rate of the marginal home owner equals the Barro and Sahasakul (1984) series prior to 1987
and 0.25 since then.
Three other variables are used in the estimation of the model. Consumption expenditures
per household converted to real dollars by the GDP deflator serve as a proxy for permanent
income (YP). The United States population age 16 and over measures adult population (POP).
Replacement cost (PRC) equals the national Boeckh construction cost index for apartments.

Estimation Procedure and Results

This section describes the estimation procedures and discusses the empirical results.
Several alternative specifications were examined and evaluated. We focus attention on our sense
of the "best" model.
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Estimation Procedure
The econometric model summarized above is a four equation simultaneous system.
Parameter estimates are generated using 2SLS with a modification described in Kmenta (1986) to
account for the presence of lagged endogenous variables among the regressors. Kmenta suggests
treating lagged endogenous variables as if they are current endogenous variables and using current
and lagged purely exogenous variables as instruments in 2SLS. This approach generates
consistent 2SLS parameter estimates when lagged endogenous variables are among the
regressors. The further issue of serial correlation is addressed by Greene (1993), Fair (1970), and
others who offer procedures for estimating simultaneous equation models with lagged
endogenous variables and serially correlated errors.
Coefficient Estimates
Table 2 presents 2SLS estimates for the model's four equations. The sign patterns are
largely as expected and several parameters are significant at the 5 percent level. The short-run
rent and income elasticities of rental housing demand per household equal -0.267 and 0.174. The
partial adjustment coefficient equals 0.262, indicating that about 26 percent of the gap between
current demand and its long-run equilibrium value is closed in one year, and about 60 percent
after three years. The long-run rent elasticity is -1.019 and the long-run income elasticity is
0.664. The results reported in Table 2 are not corrected for serial correlation, although Durbin's h
statistic of 2.66 indicates that it is present.9

9

If the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is true, then Durbin's h statistic has a standard
normal distribution in large samples. An iterative Prais-Winsten procedure produces a serial
correlation coefficient of 0.772 for the services demand equation, assuming an AR(1) error
structure. Corrected for serial correlation, the estimated demand equation is:
ln(q)

9.344
(1.782)

0.705 ln(pr)
(0.167)

0.591 ln(YP)
(0.115)

0.396 ln (q 1)
(0.099)
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The demand for rental units is reflected in the renter households equation. The partial
adjustment coefficient of 0.083 implies that adjustment to long-run equilibrium is considerably
slower for units demand than for services demand. Only 8 percent of the gap between the current
number of renters and the long-run equilibrium value is closed each year, and about 23 percent
after three years. Increases in both the price of renting relative to owning and average household
income reduce the number of renter households. The relative housing price elasticity equals 0.016 in the short-run and -0.193 in the long-run. The relative price coefficient is significantly
negative at the 5 percent level, but the housing price effects on tenure choice are rather modest.
The hypothesis that an increase in rent and a decrease in the user cost of home ownership have the
same impact on tenure choice is not rejected at standard significance levels. The short-run and
long-run income elasticities are -0.111 and

-1.337. Their magnitudes imply that household

income levels play a larger role in tenure choice than do relative housing prices. Their negative
signs suggest a preference for home ownership which can be more readily satisfied as average
household income increases. However, the income coefficient is significantly negative only at the
10 percent level. Population growth increases the number of renter households modestly in the
short-run and more than proportionally in the long-run. One percent growth in the adult
population produces 0.134 percent short-run growth in the number of renter households and
1.614 percent long-run growth. At the sample means, this represents 1.657 million more people
and 36,942 more renter households in the short-run and 444,964 more in the long-run. Again, the

The coefficients are statistically significant and the sign pattern is consistent with economic
theory. The short-run elasticities are more than twice as large as the uncorrected estimates, and
both long-run elasticities are about unity.
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TABLE 2
2SLS ESTIMATES OF A RENTAL HOUSING
MARKET MODEL
Variable

Parameter Estimate

Standard Error

t-Ratio

Demand: Depandant Variable = ln(q) Log of Rental Demand per Household
Adjusted R2 = 0.960

Root MSE = 0.019

DW stat = 1.130

4.063

1.432

2.837

ln(pr)

-0.267

0.122

-2.185

ln(YP)

0.174

0.101

1.715

ln(q-1)

0.738

0.088

8.388

Constant

Durbin's h = 2.66

Supply: Dependant Variable = ln(QS) Log of Aggregate Real Rental Supply
Adjusted R2 = 0.996

Root MSE = 0.016

DW stat = 1.058

-0.365

1.212

-0.301

ln(pr)

0.121

0.147

0.817

ln(ucr*PRC)

0.0005

0.012

0.040

-1.310

0.023

-1.794

0.970

0.023

41.342

Constant

ln(QS/QD)
ln(QS-1)

Durbin's h = 2.56

Renter Households: Dependant Variable = ln(NR) Log of Number of Renter HHs
Adjusted R2 = 0.998

Root MSE = 0.008

DW stat = 2.114

Durbin's h = -0.382

Constant

-0.009

0.367

-0.024

ln(pr/(uco*PR))

-0.016

0.010

-1.633

ln(YP)

-0.111

0.083

-1.332

ln(POP)

0.134

0.099

1.351

ln(NR-1)

0.917

0.111

8.286

Rent Adjustment: Dependant Variable = ln(pr/pr-1) Log of Ratio of Current to Lagged Real Rent
Adjusted R2 = 0.966

Root MSE = 0.010

DW stat = 1.749

0.009

0.013

0.699

ln(pr/(ucr*PRC))-1

-0.027

0.004

-6.228

ln(QS/QD)-1

-0.278

0.193

-1.442

Constant
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coefficient is significantly positive only at the 10 percent level. Durbin's h statistic equals -0.382
and indicates that serial correlation is not present.
The rent elasticity of aggregate rental housing supply equals 0.121, but is not significantly
positive. Although this coefficient indicates the short-run response of supply to a change in rental
price, the magnitude seems small. A one percent increase in rental price would expand aggregate
supply by $1.065 billion when evaluated at its mean. The average annual change in aggregate
supply equals $22.369 billion for 1964 through 1993. If this change approximates new
construction, then an additional $1.065 billion represents a 4.8 percent increase in new
construction. The simulation results below that take account of lags generate a larger but still
modest response. A more disturbing result is the rental user cost elasticity of 0.0005, which is
unexpectedly positive, insignificant, and considerably smaller than the rent elasticity.10 The
modest magnitudes and statistical insignificance of the rental price and user cost coefficients
suggest that the gap between rent and user cost may be less than adequate as a proxy for the gap
between asset price and replacement cost, the theoretically relevant relationship.
Increases in last year's excess supply discourage new construction that would increase
aggregate rental supply. A one percent increase in last year's excess supply decreases current
aggregate rental housing supply by 1.131 percent. The coefficient on lagged aggregate supply
equals 0.97. We intended to recover an estimate of the depreciation rate from this coefficient in
combination with some restrictions regarding the interpretation of the intercept. Unfortunately,

10

The theoretical model suggests that additions to aggregate supply depend upon profit
opportunities reflected in the difference between rent and user cost. An alternative supply
equation imposed this restriction by including a variable defined as the difference in the logs of
rent and user cost [ln(pr)-ln(ucr*PRC)]. Given the insignificance of the individual parameters, it
is not surprising that the restricted parameter is insignificant, but the restriction implied by this
variable is not rejected at standard significance levels. The excess supply coefficient is half as
large, while the lagged stock coefficient is essentially identical. Both coefficients are significant as
well.
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our attempts yielded implausible depreciation estimates. Durbin's h statistic of 2.56 indicates that
serial correlation is present. However, in the corrected equation, the signs of the rent, user cost
and excess supply elasticities are opposite of those suggested by economic theory.11 Given this
inconsistency, the relatively short time series, and the reasonableness of the uncorrected estimates,
the results reported in Table 2 are not corrected for serial correlation.
The rent adjustment estimates show that the real rent ratio varies inversely with both the
ratio of rent to user cost and the ratio of aggregate supply to aggregate demand.12 A 1 percent
decrease in rental user cost would increase the ratio of rent to user cost by approximately 1
percent. In the following year, this reduces the rate of growth in real rent by 0.027 percentage
points. A 1 percentage point increase in last year's growth rate of excess supply reduces this
year's growth rate of real rent by 0.278 percentage points, or ten times as much as a user cost
increase. Thus, real rents are more responsive the quantity changes reflected in the supply to
demand ratio than to price changes reflected in the rent to user cost ratio. However, the excess
11

An iterative Prais-Winsten procedure yields a serial correlation coefficient of 0.542,
assuming an AR(1) error structure. Corrected for serial correlation, the estimated supply
equation is:
ln(QS)

2.772
(1.216)

0.268 ln(pr)
(0.149)

0.016 ln (ucr PRC)
(0.012)

0.528 ln(QS/QD)
(0.693)

1

0.931 ln(QS) 1.
(0.027)
12

The rent adjustment equation was first estimated exactly as indicated in the model summary.
ln(pr)

0.631
(0.452)

0.911 ln(pr)
(0.064)

0.159 [ln(QS)
(0.369)

1

0.025 [ln(pr)
(0.004)

ln(ucr PRC)]

1

ln(QD)] 1.

Two of the three coefficients are significant and have the expected signs. The lagged excess
supply ratio has a positive, but insignificant, coefficient. Since the coefficient on lagged rent is not
significantly different from one, that restriction is imposed in Table 2. The dependent variable
becomes ln(pr/pr-1), which is approximately equal to the rate of growth in real rent.
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supply coefficient is significantly negative only at the 10 percent level. Durbin's h statistic is not
computed for this equation since the lagged real rent ratio is not among the regressors. If the
Durbin-Watson statistic is approximately valid, then serial correlation is not present in the rent
adjustment equation.13
Empirical Analysis of the Structural Model
The empirical properties of the estimated model are evaluated in two ways. First, the
stability of the model is assessed by examining the path to convergence of the endogenous
variables. Second, the impact of a shock to rental user cost is determined.
To assess the stability of the model, all exogenous variables are held at their 1993 levels
while the endogenous variables are forecast for 100 years. This exercise reveals the model does
indeed converge. Aggregate supply and aggregate demand both rise by about 8 percent as the
model approaches its long-run equilibrium values. Aggregate supply increases from $1,173 billion
in 1993 to $1,272 billion after 100 years, while aggregate demand increases from $1,086 billion to
$1,175 billion. Most of the rise in aggregate demand results from the 6 percent increase in the
number of renters from 34.7 million to 36.8 million. Demand per household rises from $31,306 to
$31,913, or about 2 percent. Real rent is essentially flat, rising from $1,582 in 1993 to $1,586.
Roughly 40 percent of the change in aggregate supply, aggregate demand, and the number of
renters occurs within the first five years, while more than 70 percent of the change in demand per
household is achieved. Real rent actually rises for the first decade or so, but only by 0.66 percent,
before approaching its equilibrium level.

13

Durbin's h equals 0.79 for the estimated model reported in the previous note which does not
restrict the coefficient on lagged real rent to equal one. The null hypothesis of no serial
correlation is not rejected.
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An important issue in analyzing the rental housing market is the speed and magnitude of
the response of market rents to changes in the user cost of capital. Changes in rental user cost
may be generated by a variety of factors, including interest rates, expected inflation and tax policy.
The simulations conducted by HFL and FHL predict that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 generates a
10 percent increase in the user cost of rental housing capital. Based upon their assumptions
regarding the nature of the rental housing market, they predict that market rents will also rise by
10 percent in the long-run. We investigate this process with our estimated model by assuming
rental user cost rises by 10 percent in the initial year. The simulation results indicate that rent
increases by about 5 percent, but only after 100 years! Real rent increases very gradually in the
initial years following the user cost shock, while the supply and demand variables decline over
time. After five years, real rent is 1.1 percent higher and other endogenous variables are smaller
by 0.7 percent or less. Excess supply rises for several periods since aggregate demand is declining
faster than aggregate supply, and thus offsets some of the shock's effect on real rent. After ten
years, real rent is 1.8 percent higher than initially, while the remaining system variables are smaller
by 1.5 percent or less. Real rent is 4.0 percent higher after 50 years, so the adjustment process is
indeed a very long one.
Although a detailed comparison of our results with those of DiPasquale and Wheaton
(1992) is difficult because of the many differences in variable definition and model specification, a
rough comparison is instructive. Both studies estimate similar magnitudes for the own price
elasticity of the demand for rental housing. However, DiPasquale and Wheaton find a positive
relationship between income and the demand for rental units, whereas our results convey a more
consistent role for income. We find a positive income elasticity of housing demand per renter
household and a negative income elasticity of the probability of renting. The most important
comparison pertains to the responsiveness of rent to changes in user cost. Both find less than a
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complete response of rent to a change in user cost triggered by a tax policy change. In fact, they
find that rent is even less responsive to a change in user cost than we do. They find that TRA
increases user cost by four percentage points or, roughly, from 4 to 8 percent, which is a 100
percent increase. Rents only increase by 8 percent in response to this user cost change. We
simulate the effect of a 10 percent increase in user cost, which is the estimate provided by both
HFL and FHL in their analysis of TRA, and find that rents increase by 4 percent.

Conclusions

The primary purpose of this paper is to estimate a structural model of the rental housing
market in which the distinction is made between housing units and housing services and in which
it is possible to identify the extent and speed with which real rents adjust to shocks in the user
cost of capital. The signs of the coefficients in the four equation model are all as expected and
most of the elasticity estimates seem reasonable, especially the estimates of the elasticities of the
services and units demand equations. The long-run rental price and income elasticities of housing
services demand equal -1.02 and 0.66. The long-run elasticity of rental units demand is -0.19 for
income and -0.02 for the relative rental to ownership price.
The impact of shocks to user cost on the level of rents is of primary interest. A 10 percent
increase in user cost raises the level of real rents by about 4 to 5 percent, so only half of the user
cost increase is passed along as higher rents. About half of this net impact is realized within the
first decade after the increase in user cost. One surprising aspect of the results is the indirect path
by which user cost has its impact. We expected to find most of the response reflected in the
coefficient on rental user cost in the supply equation, but this coefficient is essentially zero and
excess supply generates the larger effect on aggregate supply. Instead, rent adjustments are more
sensitive to the ratio of real rent to user cost. These two effects combine to produce a positive
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linkage between rent and user cost, though a modest one. An increase in user cost causes rents to
rise more rapidly. Higher rents reduce housing demand and increase excess supply, which then
reduces the aggregate supply of rental housing.
Although the less than complete response of rents to user cost changes is a result also
obtained by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992), this result is inconsistent with the assumptions
implicit in the simulation analysis of HFL, FHL and many others who assume a perfectly elastic
supply of housing and a relatively rapid and complete adjustment of rents to changes in user cost.
Three broad explanations of why we find rents so slow to adjust to user cost are possible. First,
perhaps land prices adjust to the user cost shock along with rents. Implicit in the analysis of HFL
and other proponents of the long-run equilibrium user cost model is the assumption that the longrun price of housing is fixed at the replacement cost of capital. Of course, rental properties also
include a land component. If the value of this component is substantial and sensitive to changes in
demand for rental housing, then the asset price of such housing would decline in response to a
major shock like TRA.
Second, our measure of the user cost of capital may be flawed. However, since we use
one commonly espoused in the literature, this casts doubt on a much broader set of measures than
our own. At least two flaws seem possible. First, the use of a single discount rate may understate
the importance of tax benefits and overstate the importance of expected capital gains. Second,
tax policy may itself be endogenous, as FLH suggest. For example, builders believe that Congress
will alter tax policy if the market is either too strong or too weak. If so, then user cost will not be
as volatile as our measure implies. Future empirical research exploring these two issues may
prove fruitful.
The last and most likely explanation for the slow adjustment relates to the data employed
in this study. In a previous section we acknowledge several weaknesses in the data used to
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address these questions, including the absence of an asset price index and, most importantly, the
small sample size. Perhaps these weaknesses are simply too severe to permit identification of the
link between real rent and user cost at this time using national aggregate data. A better
understanding of the linkage may only be possible with more and better data and by using data for
smaller market areas like the metropolitan housing market. But even this approach is unlikely to
settle the issue definitively owing to the complexity of the effects being examined and the severe
data requirements. Nonetheless, efforts in this direction ought to be continued. Without
additional empirical evidence, simulation models which assume a strong linkage will remain
subject to serious criticisms.
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